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Pioneering Experiences in Permitting and Safety of Integrated Hydrogen Systems
Susan Schoenung, Longitude 122 West, Inc., plus Co-Authors



Introduction
This work was presented at the 2007 NHA conference, and is presented here in summary form. Under the auspices of the International Energy Agency’s Hydrogen Implementing Agreement, a working group has been evaluating and comparing experiences with integrated hydrogen demonstration systems, including a comparison of permitting requirements and safety designs. The group, called Annex 18 Evaluation of Integrated Systems, has considered recently developed projects for both vehicle refueling stations and also renewables-based fuel cell power systems with hydrogen as an energy storage medium. Specific projects include hydrogen vehicle fueling stations in Malmö, Sweden, Reykjavik, Iceland, and Vancouver, Canada. Also included are renewables-powered domestic residences in England and Italy, and a building load-leveling system in Japan. Other systems include a combined power and fueling station in Las Vegas, US, a series of French residential fuel cells and a fuel cell powered factory vehicle. In general the experience has been that there are few formal standards or approaches for permitting and safety, so that at each facility developers worked with local fire officials and referred to other standards, such as those for natural gas. In several cases, safety has been provided by building special facilities or separate spaces for the different subsystems.

Annex 18 has been underway since the beginning of 2004, and is scheduled to operate through 2009. The overall objective of Annex 18 is to provide information on progress in the hydrogen economy. Other objectives are to assess integrated hydrogen demonstration projects in member countries and to provide lessons learned and design guidelines. Integrated hydrogen systems, by definition, include a minimum of two hydrogen components. Most of the systems evaluated in Annex 18 consist of a source of hydrogen (generated by electrolysis or reforming), hydrogen storage, and an end use system (either stationary fuel cell or vehicle power plant). In Annex 18 there are currently fifteen member countries and three subtasks:

  • Subtask A: Information Base Development
  • Subtask B: Demonstration Project Evaluation
  • Subtask C: Synthesis and Lessons Learned

While the Annex 18 experts have evaluated many aspects of system performance, one area of focus has been permitting and safety experiences and public acceptance. In general the experiences have been positive, with high visibility and good public acceptance.

Integrated Hydrogen Demonstration Systems
During Phase 1 of Annex 18, nine systems were evaluated in some detail. These cover the spectrum of system types, including vehicles, refueling stations, grid-connected systems, and stand-alone renewable-powered systems. Fuel cell uses include buses, cars, telecom power, building heat and power and grid power. The systems are described briefly in Table 1.

Table 1: Integrated Hydrogen Systems evaluated by IEA HIA Annex 18

PROJECT/LOCATION HYDROGEN SOURCE APPLICATION
ECTOS buses / Iceland Geothermal electrolysis (3) Citaro fuel cell buses with Ballard fuel cells
Pacific Spirit Station / Canada Industrial waste (5) Ford Focus fuel cell vehicles
FIRST telecom power / Spain PV electrolysis 400 W Remote telecom power
Energy station / Las Vegas Steam reformer 50 kW Plug Power stationary fuel cell / grid
Takasago integrated system / Japan Renewable to grid / MH storage 5 kW regenerative / building load-leveling
Hydrogen and Renewables Integration (HARI) project / UK PV/wind/hydro electrolysis 2 kW residential heat and power; 5 kW power
Italian hydrogen house PV electrolysis 5 kW PEM estate power
EPACOP / France Natural gas reforming (5) 4 kW residential for heat and power
H2 Truck / Denmark Refillable canister 1.2 kW fuel cell powered factory loading truck

Permitting and Safety Experiences
For the hydrogen systems analyzed to date in Annex 18, various characteristics have been evaluated, including permitting and safety requirements and approaches. In Reykjavik, project leaders relied on other’s experiences for developing safety standards. Although there were no regulations, a crash-proof wall was built around the station, as it is on a busy street. This added cost to the system. In Reykjavik, the alkaline electrolyzer is installed in a separate area covered by HAZMAT procedures. The fuel cell buses undergo maintenance in a special warehouse near the station. Although there have been no hydrogen-related incidents with the buses, a coolant leak and subsequent reaction led the developers to work with local emergency officials (fire and police) on formal responses.

In Vancouver, the Pacific Spirit Station is located on a federal site. Permitting was from the BC Safety Authority. In Victoria, the new station is located at a public transit facility. Permitting was also from BC Safety Authority, the Municipality and local fire department; the latter requires an emergency response plan. At Powertech, the hydrogen components are located on private property - an industrial site. HAZOPS and FMEA processes are applied. Although it was not in place for the design of these stations, the Canadian Hydrogen Installation Code has now been adopted for future stations on the Canadian Hydrogen Highway.

At Las Vegas, project designers relied on existing codes. The system uses ASME code compliant steel (not composite) hydrogen storage vessels. NFPA 50A was used to determine set-back distances for hydrogen storage. The hydrogen dispenser nozzle is compliant with SAE J2600. Distinctly different geometries for the hydrogen and blended-fuel dispenser nozzles were used so that they cannot be mistaken for one another. Other safety features include: automatic pressure-loss checks prior to and during a fueling operation, concrete platforms in the fueling areas to promote grounding, third-party-certified electrical enclosures, and all systems subjected to detailed HAZOP review.

In Japan, “there is no special regulation only for hydrogen systems.” The integrated hydrogen system is located in a company laboratory. Industrial Safety and Health Law for ventilation and the Hydrogen Gas Guidebook apply. In addition to standard industrial regulations, high-pressure codes would also be followed.

This HARI project in the UK is built on a private farm with the objective of eventually disconnecting from the local grid. As a private, domestic location, there are no official regulations. “We had to devise our own.” A Health and Safety Executive overview operation and HAZOP procedures are in place. The fire brigade was consulted as hydrogen components were installed. The hydrogen building is divided into hazardous and safe zones. The hazardous zone has three rooms: one containing the electrolyzer, one the fuel cells and the other the compressor. A passive ventilation mechanism results from the building’s layout.

At the “ecological” house in Brunate, Italy, project designers had to negotiate extensively with the local fire brigade. At Due to lack of Italian regulations for hydrogen systems, the local fire marshall (Fire Brigade of the Province of COMO) constrained the mass of hydrogen that could be stored on site and the location of subsystems. Ultimately, the amount of hydrogen stored at the site will be less than desired. The Fire Brigade also requested that a special building be built to house the stored hydrogen.

The EPACOp project in France called for the installation of commercial fuel cell systems in five locations around the country. The system design was based on European Conformity Standards for numerous related systems, although there was no precise guidance for such installations. “In the absence of official regulations dealing especially with fuel cell technology, EC directives were used.”

In Denmark, the H2 Truck is a commercially available product. It is CE certified. The developers have stated, however: “Standardization is a subject that needs immediate attention, since this already puts restraints on products coming to the market.”

The experiences gathered from Annex 18, Phase 1 project evaluations are summarized in Table 2. Various permitting experiences and codes or standards applied to hydrogen demonstration projects have been described in this paper. Currently, Annex 18 is synthesizing key lessons learned from these experiences. A standardized approach is recommended for future projects. The recent formation of the international activities such as HYPER (Hydrogen PERmitting), for example, should accelerate the move toward consistent permitting processes.

Table 2: Summary of Permitting and Safety Experiences for IEA-HIA Annex 18 Projects (52Kb PDF)



Co-authors

M. Chiesa - Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Brescia, Italy

R. Gammon - Bryte Energy Ltd., Leichestershire, UK

H. Ito - Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Institute of Japan, Tsukba, Japan

M. Maack - Icelandic New Energy, Reykjavik, Iceland

S. Miles - Natural Resources Canada, Vancouver, BC, Canada

B. Ridell - Grontmij AB, Malmö, Sweden